Wetware Drought
by Peter Coffee on February 11, 2008 at 09:21 AM
Out of 800 enterprise IT managers, 86 per cent have a hard time finding qualified people; 54 per cent have trouble keeping the ones they have.
Specifically,
- 36 per cent of them can't staff security specialists
- 31 per cent of them can't staff database administrators
- 26 per cent of them can't staff storage administrators
I mention those three disciplines, in particular, because they're skills that don't create much competitive advantage when done perfectly, but they represent enormous downside risks when done less well. So, why retain the burden of doing them in-house?
The numbers cited here are from an October 2007 report, "State of the Data Center," published by Symantec. Some people will use numbers like these to sell you tools that automate data center administration: I'd rather suggest that these are reasons not to have a data center at all. That's the announced goal at Sun Microsystems, where data center architect Brian Cinque has blogged on his goal of "0 SunIT Data Centers" by 2015.
People have been talking about the shift of IT cost from hardware and software to wetware since at least the 1960s. I can't quickly find it now, but I remember seeing an article from the Harvard Business Review that was dated something like 40 years ago, warning about the cost of IT starting to rise: the cost of the human components, it concluded, would swamp any further declines in (ahem) mainframe pricing.
Well, we've gone through a few more teeth of the saw since then, with any number of hard-tech discontinuities starting us on a new downward trend of overall cost -- but every one of those downslopes has a bottom. Is this the last sawtooth cycle? Nicholas Carr's The Big Switch suggests that we're at a critical point.
And 33 per cent of those 800 IT pros say that key people are retiring: solutions available now, like SaaS and PaaS, are better than solutions yet to be defined.
TrackBack
TrackBack URL for this entry: http://www.typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d8341cded353ef00e5502d514f8833
Listed below are links to weblogs that reference Wetware Drought:

Comments
Posted by Brian Cinque on February 11, 2008 04:48 PM:
Peter
From a community standpoint; do you think the service fees charged from force.com will limit or accelerate the growth potential of PAAS? Will we see more developers pay for force.com or not? Should we expect them too? Something I have been thinking about.
Brian
Posted by Peter Coffee on February 11, 2008 05:29 PM:
Brian,
I sometimes think that on my Form 1040, I should list my profession as "economist" rather than my usual fill-in of "consultant" or "engineer." I see the key issues surrounding most technologies in terms of the balance of value versus cost, and I believe that in the long run prices reach equilibrium with value. Overpriced goods and services attract competition; underpriced goods and services fail to offer a competitive return on investor equity. (I've previously commented on the relationship between these ideas and "net neutrality" at http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Infrastructure/Will-Web-Apps-Need-COPEing-Mechanisms/ )
Pardon the prologue, but that's what seems to me the key to the question of "What's PaaS worth?" I believe that an enterprise-grade platform, with peak-load capacity and uptime percentages and security that meet corporate and customer expectations, is worth more than a purely social or recreational platform that's supported by advertising revenues. As of now, that's the competitive posture of Force.com. Personally, I'm comfortable with that positioning.
This should come as no surprise, given that I spent 18 years writing for PC Week / eWEEK -- whose enterprise audience is accustomed to paying what things are worth. I didn't understand as well the consumer and enthusiast audiences of publications like PC Magazine, and thus I rarely felt that I had any useful thoughts to share with that audience. I know what Force.com is worth, and I believe that it offers good value -- and that, in the long run, excellent value combined with excellent execution is what wins. Hey, it's working for Toyota...
Thanks for being part of the conversation.
- Peter
Posted by Peter Coffee on February 16, 2008 05:21 PM:
Meanwhile, The Register reports (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/02/13/sun_datacenter_2015/) that rumors of the impending demise of Sun's data centers are premature. I don't think this weakens my argument, but it does remind us that organizations sometimes take time to acknowledge and adopt fundamental change.
Posted by Kevin Roberts on February 20, 2008 12:39 PM:
Peter.
Slightly off topic but I'd welcome your thoughts on how to address the question "What happens if my PaaS provider goes under?" In an on-premise world my applications will continue to run even if my application provided is no longer trading or is acquired or de-supports their product. That gives me some time to implement another solution. In a PaaS environment if the platform goes away then my application goes with it. I've seen other Saas providers reply to this question with "it's no different then any other vendor going away" but I think we need a better answer than that. For sure both my legal folks and my prospect's legal folks need a better answer. Should we be demanding that a PaaS provider has a minimum notice period that they must give before a service can be turned off? Thanks. Kevin.
Posted by Peter Coffee on February 20, 2008 06:46 PM:
In any application delivery decision, there's a tradeoff between speed of development and independence from any given platform.
Imagine that you decide to bring your idea to market as a platform-independent application. You need to begin, most likely, by evaluating and choosing a cross-platform GUI library. You then need to write your own code to perform high-level functions that a platform’s API might otherwise handle for you. The Force.com API, being especially high-level, makes this differential cost especially high.
You then need to decide which customer platform stacks (OS, database, middleware) to support; you have to write code and installation scripts for all of them. You need to do all of this before you even start selling code that does anything original, or even useful.
Alternatively, you could make your debut in the marketplace as a Force.com application. You spend zero time evaluating, choosing, and supporting customer infrastructure, because there’s no footprint from your application on customer infrastructure. You develop your key business logic in Apex, if you wish, or you implement some of that logic in Java or .Net or anything else that can be exposed to Force.com as a Web service. You go to market quickly with a product that’s inexpensive for the customer to evaluate and adopt. How much is that worth in speeding the process of becoming a viable company?
Hypothetically, you might find a year later that there are customers who want things you could only deliver as an on-premise application -- although that list gets shorter all the time -- or you decide to offer an open-source version of your product. Perhaps you do this to insulate yourself from service outages. You re-host the business logic quickly, you implement the things that Force.com was doing for you – at considerable expense, but you can do that, and you only implement things that work and that you want to keep – and you crank the input of your version 1.0 users into your version 2.0. But you do this as a going concern, with an existing customer base and revenue stream, and without the risk that someone else will get first-mover advantage while you’re laboring through a traditional development cycle just to get version 1.0 out the door.
Posted by Kevin Roberts on February 21, 2008 04:14 AM:
Thanks Peter. Certainly understand your arguments from an application developer's perspective. I think for potential clients looking for comfort that the platform isn't going to disappear is to look at the number of subscribers and assess whether a million plus users means the platform has reached critical mass.